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1. INTRODUCTION
Russia's economic transition in the past decade from a
centrally-planned to a market-oriented economy has occurred
within a dramatically changing political, social, and cultural
context. The biggest shift occurred in late 1991, when more than
seven decades of communist rule came to a swift end, the former
U.S.S.R. was dissolved, and Russia started on a new course toward
a more democratic political system and a market-oriented
economy.
With these changes, many new ideas, attitudes, and practices
have emerged; yet, numerous influences from the past continue to
affect the thoughts and behavior of most Russians.' These
converging forces have evoked much uncertainty regarding the
interpretation of what constitutes ethically acceptable behavior for
Russians, including those involved in business. In this confusing
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environment, no single set of business ethics has yet emerged.
Some observers describe at least two distinct sets of ethics, one
which blatantly disregards ethical constraints, and another which
observes generally accepted universal ethical norms.2
The prevailing unstable situation calls into question the future
of Russian values and behaviors, including those affecting business
practices and their ethical underpinnings. Various scenarios have
been visualized which are plausible directions for Russian business
given the present uncertainties of ethical boundaries. One analyst
summarized two possible scenarios focusing upon the criminal
element.3  An optimistic scenario emphasizes the need for
patience while the criminal element evolves toward more
mainstream behavior. This group could emerge as a cadre of
"rough-and-ready entrepreneurs of contemporary Russia," much
like the "robber barons" of nineteenth century America. A more
pessimistic scenario emphasizes that the criminal element emerged
in unique historical circumstances for an industrialized country:
the capital stock passed from the State into the hands of these
private individuals, as well as government apparatchiks. Neither
of these groups created the wealth they accumulated through this
process. This second scenario concludes that it would be a long
time, if ever, before these powerful groups would yield to the
forces of a free market and engage in more legitimately-based
business activities.
Expanding upon these useful observations, different ethical
principles could be attributed to various groups in Russian
business. A disregard for ethical norms is clearly obvious among
those involved in the criminal mafia that is so pervasive in the
Russian economy. In contrast, managers in state-owned enterpris-
es, as well as government apparatchiks, could be seen as deriving
ethical principles from their experience in communist times. A
third group of people who became involved in business activities
only after the transition to the market-oriented economy might
exhibit behavior seemingly based only on situational ethics.
While these groups are clearly distinct in Russian business, to
2 See generally ROBERT ANDERSON & PETER SHIKHIREV, "AKULY" I
"DEL'FiNY:" PSIKHOLOGIIA I ETIKA RoSSIIsKO-AMERIKANSKOGO DELOVOGO
PARTNERSTVA (1994).
' See Loren Graham, Messagefron the Acting Director, RRC NOVOSTI: THE
NEWSLETTER OF THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER (Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.), Fall 1995, at 1, 2.
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attribute a common ethical framework to all members within a
single group would be inaccurate and would not facilitate an
understanding of the behavior and business practices of managers
and entrepreneurs. It is perhaps more realistic and useful to look
beyond group identification and, instead, to analyze the forces
which have shaped the ethical mindsets of individuals.4 Various
influences may have affected the ethics and behavior of different
individuals at different times in the past, and they continue to do
so in the present turbulent and changing environment. The result
is that different ethical behaviors may prevail at different times for
the same individual, and certainly among individuals within the
same group. In short, there has been virtually no stable state for
ethical principles for many people participating in Russian
business. Instead, these Russian business people have been pulled
in many directions by competing forces, some of which prevailed
at one time, while others took precedence on other occasions.
For instance, a negative perception of entrepreneurs prevailed
during most of Russia's history but they enjoyed greater accep-
tance during the transition period.'
These often-competing forces, which have shaped the ethical
principles and business practices that ensued, are a primary focus
of this Article. They will be discussed following an overview of
Integrative Social Contracts Theory.
2. INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL CONTRACTS THEORY
Our analysis of business ethics in Russia applies the framework
of Integrative Social Contracts Theory.6  This framework
emphasizes the importance of universal hypernorms - such as
core human rights, respect for human dignity, and good citizen-
ship - which are ethical principles fundamental to human
existence.7 As such, these hypernorms constitute the minimum
threshold for ethical behavior. These over-arching principles,
' See Sheila M. Puffer et al., Meeting of the Mindsets in a Changing Russia,
Bus. HORIZONS, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 52, 52.
5 See Daniel J. McCarthy et al., The Resurgence of an Entrepreneurial Class
in Russia, J. MGMT. INQUIRY, June 1993, at 125, 126.
6 See generally Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Towarda Unified
Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 AcAD.
MGMT. REv. 252 (1994).
' See Thomas Donaldson, Values in Tension: Ethics Away from Home,
HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 48, 53-54.
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however, coexist with specific norms established and accepted
within various communities or groups. Communities are
"self-defined, self-circumscribed group[s] of people who interact in
the context of shared tasks, values, or goals and who are capable
of establishing norms of ethical behavior for themselves."' While
specific community norms may be different for different commu-
nities and may conflict with one another, they can be seen as
legitimate within their community when they are freely adopted
through micro-contracts among group members and do not violate
hypernorms. Micro-contracts "represent[] agreements or shared
understandings about the moral norms relevant to specific
economic interactions."9
An important feature of Integrated Social Contracts Theory is
that different behaviors are recognized to coexist among different
communities. When conflicts arise between norms, six criteria
proposed in the theory can be applied to help resolve them.
These six rules, presented in Appendix 1, must be applied as a set,
with no a priori assessment of relative importance among them.
After applying these principles to a given situation, the legitimacy
of a community's norm can be established, even if it is in
opposition to legitimate norms of other communities. This
framework is particularly applicable to the assessment of transac-
tions among Russians within the transitional business environ-
ment, as well as situations in which Russians conduct business
with people from other countries. Russia's unique history and
culture, as well as the turbulent transition to a market economy,
underscore the value of such an approach.
3. THREE FORCES INFLUENCING BUSINESS ETHICS IN RussIA
This section summarizes some of the most important forces
influencing the development of Russia's business ethics and is
excerpted from our earlier work on this topic.0 The forces
which will be discussed are: (1) the culture, history, and religion
of Russia; (2) communist ideology and the centrally-planned
economy; and (3) Russia's present transitional environment,
8 Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 6, at 262.
9Id.
"0 See Sheila M. Puffer & Daniel J. McCarthy, Finding the Common Ground
in Russian and American Business Ethics, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1995, at 29,
32-34.
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including the legal system, government policy, and social values.
Russia's turbulent history has been characterized by oppressive
political regimes that have created confusion about the role and
importance of business in Russian society, as well as conflicting
standards of ethical business behavior. This history, coupled with
the recent turmoil created by the move toward a market econo-
my, has created ambiguity among business people about what
constitutes ethical behavior. Unfortunate personal consequences
of such ambivalence have included the growing number of
business people with psychiatric and addictive problems stemming
from moral conflicts."
The important and often conflicting influences contributing to
this uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding standards of ethical
business behavior include the high value placed on strong
authority and collective behavior in traditional Russian culture,
communist ideology, and the country's political and legal
structures.
Russian culture, over the centuries, is replete with ruling elites
and authority figures who tightly controlled society and sup-
pressed personal freedom. Among these figures were leaders of
the Russian Orthodox Church, tsars, landowners, and the
Communist Party elite. The population was subjugated to the
values and behaviors of these leaders, regardless of who was in
control of the country. The continuous lack of individual
freedom that resulted, as well as the pervasiveness of social and
economic control, strongly shaped Russian values. The Russian
Orthodox Church imbued Russians with Christian values, such as
obeying the golden rule. However, unlike the Protestant Church,
the Russian Orthodox Church did not value work as a religious
virtue. Thus, people who engaged in business were often
suspected of having selfish and, implicitly, unethical motives.
Instead, the Russian Orthodox Church emphasized deference
and obedience to its doctrine and religious authority figures, thus
reinforcing obedience to authority rather than individual responsi-
bility. Collective values were another fundamental element of
religious doctrine, and people were encouraged to subjugate
personal interests to the common good. The political environ-
ment under the tsars and the economic power of the landowners
" See Peter N. Shikhirev, Ethics, Psychology and Business in Russia (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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were grounded in the same autocratic and oppressive philosophies.
In summary, Russians experienced an all-encompassing environ-
ment of central control, oppression, and the lack of individual
freedom and opportunity for centuries.
The situation changed little under communist rule, whose
ideology provided a second major influence on Russian ethics.
Centralized authority, subjugation of the individual, political and
economic oppression, and collectivist values predominated. The
Communists, however, tried to instill a work ethic in the general
population to serve communist goals, and designed a reward
system that recognized collective rather than individual achieve-
ments. Thus, individuals had little incentive to work hard or take
personal responsibility for their actions. Even the collective
rewards were not perceived as equitable by many people who
became disillusioned with this, as well as other broken promises
of material and psychic gratification.
The communist philosophy was distilled in 1962 into a twelve
point moral code intended to guide the ethical behavior of loyal
Communists.12 In some respects, the code was similar to the ten
commandments of the Judeo-Christian tradition, but was modified
to reflect the atheistic communist philosophy. As in other areas
of communist ideology, however, implementation of the code
failed and few took it seriously. The nomenklatura (ruling
Communist elite) violated it as they saw fit, justifying virtually
any means, ethical or unethical, to achieve desired ends. This
hypocrisy of the ruling elite created a harsh reality that encour-
aged people at all economic levels to break rules to survive within
the rigid demands of the system. In business, it was an accepted
common practice to pad production figures to give the appearance
of meeting the centrally-prescribed plan and thus to obtain
rewards.
Another communist goal was the elimination of status
differences in society to provide more equal access to opportuni-
ties for people from all social levels. For the first time, people of
peasant origin were encouraged to pursue higher education and
professional and managerial job opportunities. However, this goal
and others like it were subverted as the Communist Party elite
became more entrenched, reserving privileges and positions of
12 See generally RICHARD T. DEGEORGE, SOVIET ETHICS AND MORALITY
(1969).
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influence for themselves. These actions reinforced the fact that
ability and accomplishment were not the determining factors for
success. Rather, Communist Party membership and loyalty
provided the status which became necessary to achieve power and
privilege within society. The Communists effectively emerged as
the new ruling elite.
A third major influence on the development of Russian
business ethics has been the country's political and legal structures
and institutions. Much of the political environment under the
tsars and Communists has been discussed above, the primary
characteristics being centralized dictatorship, oppression of
individual expression, and little freedom or opportunity for most
of the population. The result was a passive and obedient
population with little tolerance for individual accomplishment,
business activities, or entrepreneurship. In the legal environment,
laws and edicts were dictated by tsarist and communist authorities
with little opportunity for dispute, and trial by jury did not exist.
Under Communism, there were so many meaningless, and often
contradictory, laws and regulations governing business activities
that managers had to become adept at circumventing them in
order to meet the unrealistic goals assigned by central authori-
ties.13 This was a widely accepted practice, and even central
authorities looked the other way, since it was not considered a
serious violation, but simply a pragmatic way of doing business.
Nevertheless, flagrantly criminal behavior, such as major theft of
company property, as well as serious breaches of communist
ethics, such as disloyalty to the Party, were severely and publicly
punished.
The legalization of private enterprise in the late 1980s became
a major source of widespread ethical confusion. Communist
philosophy did not recognize the existence of private property or
profits, yet both became legalized, and even mandated, by Soviet
and Russian laws. Many such laws were passed within the context
of the developing free enterprise system. They often contradicted
one another, were frequently amended or rescinded, and were
inconsistently enforced.
This chaotically-evolving legal structure gave little direction to
people engaged in business. Individuals had to define for them-
13 See generally JOSEPH S. BERLINER, SOVIET INDUSTRY FROM STALIN TO
GORBACHEV (1988).
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selves the proper conduct in business relationships. These business
people came from different backgrounds and often held different
values. Among those who entered the business world were
managers of state enterprises, former high-ranking Party officials,
academics, students, other professionals, and black marketeers.
Some business people were guided by the values and accepted
practices of the former communist system, others by universal
values or religious beliefs, and others by criminal and unscrupu-
lous motives. Still others, lacking experience in a market
economy, simply were ignorant of what constituted ethical
behavior in such radically new and uncertain circumstances.
4. APPLYING THEORY TO PRACTICE
To analyze the ethical legitimacy of several current business
practices in Russia, we have applied the Integrative Social
Contracts Theory to six common situations which many observ-
ers would consider ethically questionable in one sense or another.
We have particularly emphasized the six principles for resolving
conflicts between shared values of specific communities within
Russian business, or business communities in other countries. We
have also integrated the effects of the primary forces that have
shaped values within these different communities. By doing so,
we have attempted to clarify the ethical appropriateness of these
six particular business practices. These practices and their
relationship to the six principles for resolving ethical conflicts are
summarized in Appendix 2.
We first apply the theory to three highly questionable
practices in Russia: extortion, managerial buy-outs of enterprises,
and the breaking of contracts. These practices would be consid-
ered by many to violate universal hypernorms as well as the
norms of most communities in Russia. Our evaluation of these
practices, utilizing the six principles, leads us to the conclusion
that they are clearly unethical behaviors. Three additional
practices, ignoring arbitrary or senseless laws, using personal
favoritism or blat, and laying off employees, do not violate
hypernorms, and we assume that the conflicting community
norms are legitimate in the Donaldson and Dunfee sense. Since
the ethicality of these practices can be ambiguous in some
communities, however, the six principles are especially helpful in
drawing conclusions. With the exception of employee layoffs,
which remains an ethically ambiguous practice, the latter three
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practices do not seem to violate community norms in Russia and
generally seem to be ethical there.
4.1. Extortion
Extortion involves demanding money, property, or services
from others through force or the threat of force. It is illegal, as
well as unethical, in virtually all societies. Extortion violates
hypernorms, such as respecting core human rights like the
ownership of property and the dignity of other human beings.
Various forces have shaped such hypernorms. For Russia these
include the country's history and culture, the Orthodox Church,
and communist ideology. Even in the turbulent environment of
Russia's transition to a more open society and market-oriented
economy, the practice is considered illegal and immoral.
However, extortion and similar activities were pervasive in the
transitional Russian business environment. 4  Many private
enterprises and commercial banks were reported to pay an
extortion "tax" to the mafia, amounting to ten to twenty percent
of their sales."5 Virtually all Russian business communities
condemn such practices. Yet, because of the pervasiveness of the
criminal mafia, and the acceptance of such practices within their
community, many might consider such behavior to be "ethical"
when dealing with rival mafia members. Such behavior within
the mafia would likely be considered unethical by virtually
everyone outside the mafia, and we have applied the principles to
illustrate why this is so. In summary, this first application of the
principles will explain the unethical nature of extortion and
illustrate the utility of the framework by analyzing this obvious
breach of ethics.
Extortion is repugnant to most people since it violates the
hypernorms of respecting human dignity and personal safety, and
it is clearly unethical and illegal when mafia members extort from
members of other business communities. However, when the
practice is restricted to the mafia, and does not have significant
direct adverse effects on other communities, it could be considered
14 See Puffer and McCarthy, supra note 10, at 29; Peter Unwin & Vincent
Carratu, The Fight Against Grand Corruption and Piracy in Eastern and Central
Europe, RSA J., July 1996, at 52.
15 See EcoN. NEWSLETTER (Russian Research Center, Harvard University),
Apr. 10, 1994, at 4.
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acceptable within the mafia micro-contract (Rule 1). Within that
community, this behavior might be the norm, and as long as
other people and communities are not hurt, it might again be
appropriate (Rule 2).
The unethicality of the behavior, however, becomes clearly
apparent when applying the next four principles. Although a
serious element threatening society, the mafia is not a very
extensive community within Russia; therefore, its norms should
not take precedence over those of the broader Russian business
community (Rule 3). Similarly, extortion undermines the
functioning of a market-oriented economy, and norms essential to
maintaining the broader economic environment should have
priority over economically damaging norms (Rule 4). Norms
against extortion are consistent with norms against murder and
money laundering, crimes which often accompany extortion (Rule
5). Lastly, well-defined norms exist against extortion to the extent
that it is a crime in virtually all societies and subject to strong
legal sanctions (Rule 6).
The usefulness of the six principles in evaluating questionable
practices within business has been demonstrated by applying them
to the blatantly unethical, but unfortunately common, practice of
extortion in the Russian economy. The framework becomes
increasingly useful in analyzing five additional practices with more
ambiguous ethical interpretations.
4.2. Managerial Buy-Outs of Enterprises
Privatization in Russia allowed the ownership of many
enterprises to pass from the State to private individuals. By the
mid-1990s, more than 20,000 former state enterprises had been
privatized, along with countless thousands of small retail shops
and services. 16 Policies called for distributing ownership vouch-
ers to all workers and managers of the privatized enterprises, as
well as to other Russian citizens.' However, many managers
subverted the objective, creating citizen shareholders by accumu-
lating large percentages of shares in their own enterprises. The
resulting concentration of ownership allowed them to exercise
16 See generally MAXIM BOYCKO ET AL., PRivATIZING RussiA (1995).
1 See Daniel J. McCarthy & Sheila M. Puffer, "Diamonds and Rust" on
Russia's Road to Privatization: The Profits and Pitfalls for Western Managers,
COLuM. J. WORLD BUS., Fall 1995, at 56, 58.
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power, often to the detriment of other shareholders, the enterpris-
es, and the Russian economy. In effect, such individuals gained
most of the rights and benefits of private entrepreneurs without
many of their responsibilities, and with little risk of failure."
The privatization program even came to be dubbed by cynics as
"prikhvatizatsiia" ("grabization"), a play on the word for privatiza-
tion, "privatizatsia." Such self-serving behavior led one observer
to conclude: "We do not see many self-made Henry Fords among
our new rich. Instead we see the main tools for getting rich are
insolence, moral compromise, abuse of one's position within the
country's power structures, and crime."19
Historically, in feudalistic Russian society, private property
was only available to wealthy landowners and members of the
aristocracy. Privately-owned factories employing hired labor
appeared in the mid-nineteenth century, but the serfdom that
prevailed until that period greatly restricted the notion of private
property." In addition, anti-capitalist sentiment was a strong
tradition among many social classes in pre-communist Russia. 1
During the communist period, private property was outlawed,
with the State assuming ownership of land, real property, and the
means of production. Power resulted from the privilege of
position, rather than ownership of property. Abuse of this power
resulted in Party members, and other privileged people, receiving
favors, goods, and services unavailable to others. Later, privatiza-
tion, a cornerstone of the transition to a market economy, was an
attempt to distribute ownership of enterprises to Russian citizens.
In practice, however, ownership became concentrated in the hands
of opportunists, including enterprise managers, who saw that
ownership of their enterprises could bring them control, power,
and wealth.
Abuses resulting from such managerial buy-outs negatively
i8 See generally Igor Filatotchev et al., The Ethical Challenge of Management
Buy-outs as a Form of Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe, 13 J. BUS.
ETHICS 523, 529 (1994) (explaining that "the development of voucher buy-outs
will inevitably be followed by substantial income redistribution in favor of
managers and employees at the expense of the broader society").
19 Konstantin Zuyev, Moscow TIMES, July 23, 1995.
20 See M.E. FALKus, THE INDUSTRIAUIZATION OF RUSSIA, 1700-1914 43
(1972); ARcADIUS KAHAN, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 5-8 (Roger Weiss ed.
1989).
21 See THOMAS C. OWEN, RUSSIAN CORPORATE CAPITALISM FROM PETER
THE GREAT TO PERESTROIKA 10 (1995).
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affected many workers, other shareholders, and Russian citizens,
while violating the spirit and intent of the privatization laws.
Such buy-outs also violated norms of the broader Russian society,
which deemed such behavior unfair since these individuals did not
earn or create the wealth they acquired. In this sense, such
behavior violated the norms of the broader host community (Rule
1). Because these behaviors adversely affected other Russian
citizens in a significant way, they could not be considered
legitimate (Rule 2). Also, since they violated the norms of the
broader Russian society, they should be considered secondary to
those more widely-held norms (Rule 3). Perhaps the most
compelling argument against the abuse of ownership rights is that
these practices have the potential to undermine the emerging
economic system by unfairly controlling assets (Rule 4). Al-
though abuse of power has long existed in Russia, it has never
been viewed as legitimate. The overwhelming preference in
society has been for behavioral norms which condemn these
abuses. Included would be norms of basic fairness and honesty
(Rule 5). These pervasive and well-defined norms should clearly
take priority over the opportunistic behavior of some managers
during the period of privatization (Rule 6).
Taking the six principles in totality, the behavior of many
Russian managers who bought control of their enterprises during
the privatization period, often at extremely low prices, would be
considered by virtually all observers as unethical, even in cases
where the practice was legal. This behavior clashes with many
well-established norms of Russian society which call for fair and
just behavior in transactions with others, dependability in one's
word and contracts, and not taking unfair advantage of others
who lack information or ability to properly exercise their rights.
The uncertainties of new situations, such as ownership of private
property, and especially of paper shares, created opportunities for
some to benefit at the expense of others. In this transition
economy, the abuse of power by managers, who exploited others
and took ownership of their shares in the process, could not be
considered legitimate. Regardless of uncertainties, radical change,
and even the possible legality of some of their actions, the
negative effects on so many others must be the major basis for
legitimacy. The well-established norms of Russian society would
clearly label the actions of these opportunistic individuals as
unethical.
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4.3. Breaking Contracts
Breaking contracts has become more common in the transi-
tional economy, in contrast to the importance historically given
to honoring contracts in Russia. A highly visible example which
affected most Russian enterprises and their workforces during this
time has been the government's nonpayment of its debts to
enterprises, interfirm debt, and the ensuing delays in paying wages
for as long as six months. The head of the Russian Orthodox
Church, Patriarch Alexiy II, voiced the Church's grave concern
about this issue:
We urge the leadership of the country . . . and all those
responsible for the non-payment of pensions, wages and
student grants to recognize the urgent need for resolution
of this problem," .... At all times the Church has been
and remains on the side of the weak and the unfortunate
... it cannot fail to raise its voice in defense of those who
find themselves on the brink of life and death as a result of
tragic impoverishment."'
Although perhaps less pervasive than nonpayment of wages and
debts, the breaking of various types of business contracts had
become more common during the chaotic transitional environ-
ment.
Historically, the 1832 Russian Civil Code provided a basis for
the legitimacy of contracts. Even in communist times, the State
prepared "form" contracts in which, for instance, agreements
between Soviet foreign trade organizations and foreign firms were
spelled out in specific terms231 Soviet negotiators were generally
viewed as reliable, and international arbitration was utilized to
resolve disputes with foreign organizations. During the market
transition, the validity of contracts was confirmed by passage of
a new Western-style commercial code which enabled companies
to seek legal recourse through such bodies as the Moscow
'2 Russia's Patriarch Slams Poverty, Wage Arrears, REUTERS, Jan. 6, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
' See Randy Bregman & Sarah Carey, Contracting in Russia: Not Perfect,
but it Works, RUSSIA Bus. WATCH, Winter 1995, at 1, 4142.
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Arbitration Court. However, even though the Court sometimes
ruled in favor of Western parties, it was not uncommon for
implicated Russian companies to ignore the rulings.24 A compli-
cating factor in enforcing contracts was that shareholder approval
was frequently required before a contract could be signed. Yet,
it was often nearly impossible to determine legitimate ownership
of many enterprises.
Applying the six principles of Integrative Social Contracts
Theory, Rule 1 indicates that contracts between members of
Russian business communities should be honored, given the
historical and cultural bases for doing so, even though the
uncertainties which arose during the market transition often made
it difficult. Likewise, the wide acceptance of honoring contracts
would take precedence in conflicts about such issues (Rule 2).
And the same conclusion ensues given the acceptance by the
broader Russian society of the need to honor contracts, as well as
to keep other promises (Rule 3). The sanctity of contracts is also
fundamental to maintaining stability and predictability in the
economic environment in which Russian businesses must function
(Rule 4). And the norm of honoring contracts is consistent with
others, such as keeping one's word and maintaining trust (Rule 5).
Lastly, the norms against breaking contracts are well-defined and
also supported by laws (Rule 6).
Applying the six principles, breaking contracts is consistently
seen as unethical, and usually illegal. The norm of honoring
contracts is well established in Russian business communities and
supported by broadly accepted social and cultural norms.
Complicating factors, however, emerged in the transitional
economy. Managers encountered extreme pressures when the
government ceased paying subsidies and even debts to enterprises.
An acute cash shortage arose among enterprises and resulted in
trillions of rubles of interfirm debt and unpaid workers' wages.
Recognizing their obligations, many managers reverted to the
traditional practice of bartering goods and services to pay debts
and wages.
Although such resourcefulness could not always enable
managers to pay all their enterprise debts, it would be wrong to
24 See Richard Steffens, Resolving Commercial Disputes, BISNIS BULL., Sept.
1996, at 1 (noting that Russian companies have been known to "ignore the
findings of the court and refuse to pay").
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label their behavior as illegitimate or unethical as long as they
attempted to fulfill obligations. Such severe situational constraints
must be taken into account when interpreting behavior in the
turbulent transitional society. Failure to honor contracts is clearly
considered to be unethical in the Russian business community, but
it could come to be viewed as legitimate in extreme circumstances.
4.4. Ignoring Arbitrary or "Senseless" Laws
Arbitrary laws are those which do not make sense to business
people because they are viewed as interfering with the effective
functioning of the business environment. Given the circumstances
they have faced over time, business persons have applied what
some observers might view as situational ethics to justify ignoring
or circumventing laws considered to be arbitrary.
The reasons for this behavior can be attributed to several
influences. Historically, citizens have been faced with oppressive
laws imposed by authorities such as landowners, tsars and
communist officials. Many laws have imposed heavy taxes and
restricted freedom, such as the gentry's charter of 1785 which
empowered landowners to collect taxes from peasants.2' Since
compliance with such laws was often a threat to personal survival
and well-being, people developed a view that it was acceptable to
circumvent or ignore such laws and regulations. This mentality
led the nineteenth century Russian observer Shedrin to remark
that bad laws are compensated for by the fact that no one pays
attention to them. Also, the practice of landowners padding their
records with the names of dead serfs to obtain land was immortal-
ized in Gogol's nineteenth century novel, Dead Souls.
Many laws and requirements established during the communist
period were seen by managers as being adverse to running their
enterprises and preventing them from gaining rewards, such as
bonuses allocated by central ministries. This led to practices, such
as manipulating data in reports to central authorities, exceeding
inventory limits by hoarding, and hiring bloated work forces in
excess of authorized numbers.26 In addition, accounting practices
were centrally-controlled with the audit function being more of
a government inspection than an independent financial audit in
25 See RONALD HINGLEY, RUSSIA: A CONCISE HISTORY 89 (1991).
26 See BERLINER, supra note 13, at 89-90. See generally ALEX INKELES
RAYMOND A. BAUER, THE SOVIET CTZEN (1959.
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the Western sense.2 In the transitional economy, conflicting and
inconsistently-enforced laws and regulations led business people to
continue ignoring and circumventing them. For instance, the
accumulation of numerous tax laws could have required enterpris-
es to pay taxes exceeding 100% of profits, resulting in tax arrears
in early 1997 that were estimated at twenty-three billion dol-
lars. However, many business people became so adept at
legally avoiding the payment of taxes on their profit that the tax
police could often not find fault with their methods. This was
especially true when such taxes threatened the survival of a
business.29
The practice of ignoring senseless laws and regulations has
been pervasive in the broader Russian society, and consequently
is an accepted norm within the business communities. Thus,
when laws contradict each other or prevent the reasonable
functioning of business, it may be illegal to ignore them, but such
actions cannot be considered unethical (Rule 1). The norms
within the business communities show a distinct pattern of
circumventing laws to resolve conflict-of-norms situations.
Barring significant adverse effects on other communities within
Russia, such as the nonpayment of taxes seriously threatening the
government's functioning, these actions could be considered
legitimate (Rule 2). As in Rule 1 above, the practice of ignoring
arbitrary laws and regulations is generally accepted within Russian
society. Therefore, this global norm would likely be accepted in
the business communities (Rule 3).
However, a clear danger to the developing economic system
could emanate from the practice of ignoring so-called arbitrary
laws and regulations. Understandably, business persons might
ignore these laws and regulations and put their own interests first.
This could lead to a weakening of the economic and governmental
structures necessary to the development of a market economy. As
such, ignoring laws might come to be viewed as unethical (Rule
4). Although ignoring laws comes into conflict with the norms
2 See Margaret T.R. King, The Challenge to Accounting in Eastern Europe,
Bus. & CONTEMP. WORLD, 1994, at 112-21.
28 See Janet Guttsman, Russian Economic Problems Remain after IMF
Handout, REUTERS, Feb. 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews
File.
29 See generally Lidia Lukyanova, Will Russia Get a "Smarter" Tax Policy,
PRISM, Nov. 1996.
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of respecting authority and obeying laws, Russia's history and
culture have produced other norms such as buying favors and
turning a blind eye to the theft of State property. The latter
practice became more entrenched as legitimate during the build-up
of the communist welfare state when norms shifted from those of
sacrifice to those of entitlement." These new norms formed a
consistent pattern of behaviors designed to protect personal
survival and well-being rather than to unquestioningly follow the
mandates of higher authorities. As part of such a pattern of
acceptable behavior, ignoring senseless laws and regulations could
be considered legitimate (Rule 5). And as with personal favorit-
ism, when deciding ethicality, this set of well-defined norms
should take precedence over other conflicting or developing norms
(Rule 6).
Using the six principles for resolving conflict among ethical
norms, the practice of ignoring senseless laws is likely to be
considered legitimate in most circumstances. Russia's authoritari-
an history and repression of individual freedom have given
legitimacy to this and other related practices. Such behavior by
individuals might have been considered acceptable, and even
ethical, during the transition period. In totality, however, it may
become destructive to the functioning of a market economy and
work to the detriment of Russian citizens. If such a situation
were to materialize, a plausible scenario as the transition contin-
ues, the practice will likely come to be viewed as unethical.
4.5. Personal Favoritism or Blat
Personal favoritism, known as blat, involves "reliance for
favors upon personal contacts with people in influential posi-
tions. "" Blat takes many forms, such as giving money, goods,
or services to people in power in exchange for something of value,
such as a job, promotion, contract, or access to influential people.
Securing a favor sometimes involves payments to a series of
individuals who are instrumental in gaining access to the final
decision maker. Blat has been a common practice in Russia for
centuries. However, it is considered bribery and is illegal when
large amounts of money are involved or when highly placed
30 See Donna Bahry, Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of
Perestroika, 52 SLAVIC REv. 512, 551 (1993).
"' Puffer & McCarthy, supra note 10, at 37.
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authorities blatantly abuse their power. A number of tax
collectors, for instance, have been prosecuted during the transition
for taking large bribes from taxpayers in exchange for favorable
treatment.
32
Historical conditions which encouraged blat include the
expectation that serfs bring gifts to their landowners to gain favor
and avoid sanctions. In the broader Russian society, gift giving
has traditionally been widely accepted and expected, with gifts
frequently exchanged in both business and personal relationships,
such as when visiting companies or homes. Gifts help to bind
friendships, gain cooperation, and secure specific favors. Severe
shortages of goods and limited opportunities for individual
rewards during the communist period further contributed to the
use of blat. For instance, individuals would exchange favors, such
as accepting goods from an enterprise manager in return for
facilitating his child's admission to a university. In the market-ori-
ented economy, blat may be used to improve one's business by
gaining preferential bank financing, special terms in contracts, or
to gain access to important customers.
Because blat has been so pervasive within Russian society, it
could also be considered a norm of the business communities, and
thus ethical (Rule 1). Similarly, community norms do not bring
blat into conflict with other norms. Thus, it is considered
legitimate until it reaches the point of being illegal bribery (Rule
2). As with Rule 1, the broader community's endorsement of gift
giving is consistent with the practice of blat in business (Rule 3).
Blat in itself is not damaging to the economic system of Russia,
and may even facilitate business transactions in a traditionally
bureaucratic society. Thus, it can be considered legitimate unless
it would harm the economic system, such as when bribery occurs
(Rule 4). The practice of blat is consistent with other norms that
are considered ethical, including building networks of relatives and
friends who are reliable and trustworthy, as well as refraining
from whistleblowing to protect oneself and others against the
arbitrary use of power and punishment by authorities.
While blat would be considered by many Russians to be
inconsistent with the norm of basic fairness, the oppressive
conditions under which they live has promoted blat as a necessity
32 See LEV RUDSKII, PoDAROK ... VziATKA [GIFT ... BRIBE], NOVOE
RUssKoE SLOVO [NEW RuSsIAN WORD], July 20-21, 1996, at 17.
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for survival (Rule 5). Blat has long been a well-defined norm and
is accepted as almost inevitable given the lack of freedom and
opportunity under oppressive political regimes (Rule 6).
Applying all six rules, blat emerges as an accepted and
generally legitimate practice within Russia that developed as a
mechanism for survival under harsh conditions. However, many
Russians would consider it to be unfair, and would likely view it
as unethical under other circumstances. As Russia becomes a
market-based economy, tied more tightly to the global economy,
the ethicality of blat is likely to come into question. For instance,
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which regulates America-
ns' business practices, would likely limit the use of blat by
Russians in transactions with Americans.
4.6. Employee Layoffs
Laying off employees, especially mass layoffs, historically has
been considered unethical in Russia. During the market transi-
tion, many Russian enterprises resisted layoffs, realizing that they
would result in large-scale unemployment, as well as the possibili-
ty of political and social unrest.
The historical custom whereby patriarchical landowners took
responsibility for the well-being of the serfs who worked their
land influenced this norm. Likewise, the church provided care for
people and affirmed the right of individuals to secure their living.
During the communist period, all citizens were entitled to a job
and most were obligated by the state to work. The unstable
market transition, however, has profoundly influenced attitudes
toward layoffs and resulting unemployment in business communi-
ties. In short, the desperate condition of many Russian enterpris-
es, especially the large obsolete and uncompetitive state-owned and
partially-privatized firms, necessitated massive layoffs, resulting in
an estimated ten percent annual unemployment rate from 1991
through 1996. 31 This situation was dramatically different from
earlier periods, and thus much ambivalence and uncertainty
developed about the ethicality of laying off employees.
Applying the principles of Integrative Social Contracts Theory,
layoffs would be considered unethical because of the adverse
effects on those laid off (Rule 1). Community norms in Russian
33 See generally GUY STANDING, RUSSIAN UNEMPLOYMENT AND
ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING (1996).
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society would show a preference for maintaining employment, but
business realities might mandate layoffs for enterprise survival, as
well as continued employment for a smaller number of employees
(Rule 2). Thus, this rule in itself does not conclusively resolve the
ethical conflict, particularly during the difficult transitional
economy. Rule 3, however, recognizes the legitimacy of norms
emanating from the broader community, and thus would lead to
the conclusion that layoffs are unethical. Norms which maintain
the economic viability of a society (Rule 4), however, suggest that
layoffs are sometimes necessary for firms to survive. State
enterprises have been notorious for their bloated work forces
whose high cost and inefficiency necessitate layoffs during the new
period of market competition.
Regarding consistency among norms (Rule 5), during the
communist period, guaranteed employment was consistent with
other aspects of social policy, such as free education and medical
care. In the transitional economy, however, such consistent
norms no longer existed and citizens had to pay for education,
health care, and other services beyond severely reduced govern-
ment benefits.34 Changes such as these created confusion among
Russians as to what constitutes ethical practices. Because previous-
ly well-defined norms about layoffs no longer existed, situational
norms developed in their place, causing much uncertainty to the
interpretation of ethical behavior (Rule 6).
Taking all six rules into account, no clear resolution emerges
as to the ethicality of laying off workers in Russia, and each
instance must be evaluated in its own context. People influenced
primarily by the values of the past would likely view layoffs as
unethical, while those with business experience only in the
emerging market economy would almost certainly feel otherwise.
5. CONCLUSION
In this Article, six selected business practices in Russia have
been analyzed by applying Donaldson and Dunfee's Integrative
Social Contracts Theory. The turbulence in Russia during the
transition to a market economy has produced a number of
practices which would likely be considered unethical when
applying the hypernorms common to many societies. Yet other
' See generally LINDA J. COOK, THE SOVIET SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
WHY IT FAILED (1993).
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practices, while not violating hypernorms, are questionable from
an ethical perspective. The value of the Integrative Social
Contracts framework lies in its flexibility which requires not only
looking at ethical hypernorms, but also requires that the norms
of individual communities be considered when evaluating
behaviors and practices.
The six principles of this theory also take into account various
influences on specific communities when judging the legitimacy of
business practices, especially when these practices come into
conflict with more broadly accepted norms of other communities.
Using this methodology, the historical norms of that broader
community, as well as changes in those norms, should be
considered when evaluating business practices. For instance,
although there has been much consistency in values during the
lifetimes of most Russians, changes in social standards and values
in the Stalin era and beyond have been initiated by the younger
and better educated generations.3" These generational shifts,
which encompassed the desire for change and rising expectations,
continued into the post-perestroika period, creating new standards
and values more consistent with a market-oriented economy.
There have been a number of important business developments
in Russia. For instance, employee layoffs have gained broader
acceptance. In addition, members of the nomenklatura, whose
activities were often closely tied to the mafia in the early transi-
tion stages of accumulating wealth, later distanced themselves from
the criminal element in pursuit of more legitimate status and
business practices." It has been estimated that eighty-seven
percent of such Russians have followed this course.3 7 Although
the positive scenario, noted at the beginning of this Article, of the
criminal mafia moving toward more legitimate business practices
may not be in the offing, it is still encouraging that many former
members of the nomenklatura have chosen to do so.
As Russia becomes more active in the world economy, its
business laws and practices are likely to become increasingly
influenced by, and aligned with, the norms of the broader
international economic order. For instance, in 1996 the U.S.
" See Bahry, supra note 30, at 549-55.
36 See DMrrRY MKHEYEV, RussiA TRANSFORMED 156 (1996).
"' See Olga Kryshtanovskaia, Portrait of the Contemporary Business Elite,
DELOVOI MIR, Dec. 28, 1994, at 9.
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ambassador to the Russian Federation, Thomas Pickering,
predicted that "'within three years Russian tax laws and account-
ing standards are going to approach Western norms' and 'Russia
will be one of America's top trading partners."'
3
1
If positive developments continue to occur, increasing numbers
of people from around the world will engage in business transac-
tions with Russians. They should realize that Russia, like other
countries, will continue to have its own unique set of norms and
standards for ethical behavior. To expect otherwise would be
unrealistic given the variations in ethical norms among countries,
and the unique influences of Russia's history, politics, and culture.
When evaluating the norms and ethics of various Russian business
communities, the reasons for questionable or confusing business
practices must be understood. Techniques like the Integrative
Social Contracts Theory provide a more thorough and fair ethical
evaluation of Russian business practices than is possible by judging
them according to a set of preconceived standards.
" Padraic J. Sweeney, A Veteran Observer, BISNIS BULL., Nov. 1996, at 2.
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APPENDIX 1
Six Principles for Evaluating the Ethicality of Behavior39
Rule 1. Transactions solely within a single community, which do
not have significant adverse effects on other humans or communi-
ties, should be governed by the host community's norms.
Rule 2. Community norms indicating a preference for how
conflict-of-norms situations should be resolved should be applied,
so long as they do not have significant adverse effects on other
humans or communities.
Rule 3. The more extensive or more global the community
which is the source of the norm, the greater the priority which
should be given to the norm.
Rule 4. Norms essential to the maintenance of the economic
environment in which the transaction occurs should have priority
over norms potentially damaging to that environment.
Rule 5. Where multiple conflicting norms are involved, patterns
of consistency among the alternative norms provide a basis for
prioritization.
Rule 6. Well-defined norms should ordinarily have priority over
more general, less precise norms.
" The following six Rules are taken verbatim from Donaldson & Dunfee,
supra note 6, at 269-70.
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APPENDIX 2
Evaluating the Ethicality of Six Questionable Russian Business
Practices
Business Practice
Principles for Evaluating Behavior
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Extortion U U U U U U Unethical
2. Managerial Buy-Outs U U U U U U Unethical
3. Breaking Contracts U U U U U U Unethical
4. Ignoring Senseless E E E E/U E E Ethical
Laws
5. Personal Favoritism E E E E E/U E Ethical
(Blat)
6. Layoffs U E/U U E E/U E/U Ethical/
Unethical
E: Ethical
U: Unethical
E/U: Ambiguous whether ethical or unethical
Conclusions
1304 [Vol. 18:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss4/7
